

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Studies in Art Education
A Journal of Issues and Research

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usae20

Thinking Affective Pedagogies at the Intersection of Popular Media, Digital Technology, and Gurokawaii

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To cite this article: Laura Trafí-Prats (2021) Thinking Affective Pedagogies at the Intersection of Popular Media, Digital Technology, and Gurokawaii, Studies in Art Education, 62:3, 209-221, DOI: 10.1080/00393541.2021.1936427

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00393541.2021.1936427

Published online: 15 Sep 2021.

Studies in Art Education: A Journal of Issues and Research
2021, *62*(3), 209–221
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00393541.2021.1936427

"Affective pedagogy requires thinking and acting in relational fields that are not linear."

Thinking Affective Pedagogies at the Intersection of Popular Media, Digital Technology, and Gurokawaii

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In this article, I propose an affect approach to learning events concerning relations between children, popular media, and digital technology. Affect conceives learning as an aesthetic event in which particles of the world pass into bodies and transform their capacities to feel, perceive, and think. A conceptual discussion on affect and affective pedagogy is developed. This discussion is extended through an ethnographic narrative connected to a small study constructed from a layered perspective as mother/scholar/art educator and centered on the creative activity of a 10-year-old girl with digital technology and a passionate attachment to manga and anime. Implications from this study are drawn for an affective pedagogy that orients toward learning's immanence and recognizes the emergent ways in which bodies, things, and forces enter into composition, augmenting or depressing the potentials in pedagogical events.

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Introduction

In summer 2020, when school ended and holidays began, Ingrid, my 11-year-old daughter, intensified her activity online in ways that I had not seen her doing before. Prior to the first COVID-19 lockdown ordained in the UK in March, Ingrid did not have regular access to a personal computer at home or at school. She sporadically used an old iPad for drawing and playing casual games, but her predominant inclination was to draw using traditional materials.

By late March 2020, Ingrid's primary school moved to online provision during the same hours that my husband and I teleworked in our respective jobs. This precipitated the decision to give Ingrid an old laptop to do her academic work. Sheltered in place with two adults working for long hours, and without possibilities of meeting her friends face-to-face, Ingrid soon began to utilize the laptop for a diversity of things and moved across the house carrying it as if she carried an entire world with her.

Long periods of Ingrid's day went into watching female YouTubers commenting on the latest TikTok videos and other media. This especially intensified when school ended in early July 2020 (UK school calendar). While playing these YouTube videos, Ingrid sat with the laptop at her side, with headphones on, drawing manga *shoujos*,[1] designing Gacha Life[2] skits, or creating her own videos using the aforementioned iPad. Since then, this has become a daily way of making her own space and time (Figure 1).

In this article, I build on Hickey-Moody's (2013a) concept of "affective pedagogy" (p. 79), which suggests "that aesthetics teach us by changing how we feel" (p. 79). I look at how Ingrid's use of and exposure to the popular culture of manga, anime, and YouTube expanded during the time of being sheltered in place. Further, I analyze how, through the affordances of digital technology, these activities not only changed Ingrid's capacities in making art, but as Atkinson (2018) has noted, in "building a life" (p. 6). For Atkinson, practices of art learning could be ontogenetic, and thus insert an existential and epistemic differentiation. This could happen when children open themselves to explore, engage, and experiment with materials, technologies, spaces, images, or cultural phenomena that are new to them, and where possibilities for thinking and acting differently come through.

The study discussed here centers on children's creative activity. It connects with scholarship developed at the intersection of childhood studies and art education that has paid attention to the roles of art, play, and aesthetics in shaping children's everyday lives, knowledge, and experience (Schulte & Thompson, 2018; Thompson, 2017; Wilson, 2008). This scholarship assumes that children's creative endeavors are enriched through relations with popular media and through the affordances of digitally saturated environments (Duncum, 2014, 2020; Freedman, 2003). This scholarship has offered rich insights on the role of some informal spaces of art education, where young people have been perceived as active creators of their aesthetics, cultures, and methods of learning (Freedman et al., 2013; Manifold, 2009; Olsson, 2016). In dialogue with this scholarship, I am interested in researching Ingrid's art and creative methods in an informal setting (the home) and in connection to the popular culture to which she is attached (manga and anime) as well as the work of young female YouTubers who discuss cultural phenomena convergent with manga and anime. I am interested in how this attachment



Figure 1. Different moments of Ingrid's online activity and art creation in summer 2020, reproduced with kind permission of the author.

shapes Ingrid's subjectivity. In difference with this scholarship, my focus is on the role of affect, on how encounters of bodies, technological affordances, images, things, and temporalities mix and change the composition of bodies, and more prominently, their capacity to act and be acted on.

Understanding affect is important in education because affect concerns "the materiality of change" (Hickey-Moody, 2013a, p. 81). It marks the passage from a sensory state to another in the relations of bodies and things. As Dernikos et al. (2020) have noted, affect's pedagogy happens beyond "teachers' conscious intentions with learning sparking in the becomings encountered when bodies (human and nonhuman) meet" (p. 15). I call this *pedagogy's affective force*, where heterogenous and unexpected aspects come to shape learning events that are planned by neither the teacher nor the learner, and transcend criteria habitually used for thinking about the relations between childhood, art, and learning.

In this article, I approach Ingrid's relations with popular media, digital technology, and artmaking with a focus on learning events that carry affective force. I am aware that by focusing on the home environment and informal situations of play I am working with an *anomalous place of learning*. As Ellsworth (2004) has noted, anomalous places of learning allow a thinking of pedagogy not from the dominant spaces of education but with an eccentric view that considers other learning experiences that are more difficult to classify as pedagogical phenomena, but that permit thinking in "the experience of self in the making" (p. 120), which coincides with the argument noted earlier in reference to Atkinson (2018) that art learning events are existential and ontogenetic.

An Affect Approach to Art, Media, and Learning

Art theory (O'Sullivan, 2001) and art education (Hickey-Moody, 2013a, 2013b) have followed the philosophy of Spinoza (1959) and his concept of *affectus* to describe affect as the effect that another body can have on one's own body. In Spinozian terms, a body could be anything with capacity to affect, not just a human body. It could be an art object, an image, a sound, and so on. Following Spinoza, Deleuze (1988) has argued that affects are moments of intensity that can transform the trajectory of a body. In seeing affect as an intensity, Deleuze connected affect to materiality, making it an impersonal affect on the body, and thus he differentiated it from emotion, which is personal and subjective. However, affect is not completely disconnected from emotion (Hickey-Moody, 2013a). The increases or decreases of body capacities that affect conveys register psychological impacts and provoke a change of emotional states. While social theory and educational theory provide tools to interpret emotions, an affect approach demands new research modes that focus on more than human states of relation and composition. Affect-based research maps passages of the world into bodies, and moments when bodies change trajectories, avoiding an interpretation of emotions as exclusively tied to the subject's internal life (Massumi, 2002).

O'Sullivan (2001) has noted that considering the materiality of affect propels a thinking of art not as object but as a *zone-event* where something new may happen. Utilizing a mode of thinking that deterritorializes knowledge out of its usual parameters, art may truly be the realm where affect could be thought. Art could be a space where other modes of perception, sensibility, and relations with the world that transcend mundane perception can be entertained, and where a body could be thought of as more capacious.

Essential to this notion of a renewed sensibility is an understanding of the body in tune with Deleuze and Guattari's (1977) concept of *the body without organs*. This is a body that is porous and open to be affected. Thus, affect is connected to aesthetic responsiveness and to how affect's pedagogical force "teaches us to

feel in certain ways" (Hickey-Moody, 2013a, p. 83). Affect brings the possibility of understanding children and young people's attachment to some artistic manifestations as more than an intentional choice. Affect is a contagious force that propagates in bodies endowing powers to feel, move, sense, and imagine in new ways (Hickey-Moody, 2013a).

Thus, affect transforms a body's awareness of the world, but it does it through a logic of sensation rather than a logic of representation (Massumi, 2002). It makes a body move and transform before it can consciously appraise or notice the cause of such movement. Consequently, affect unfolds in a plane of immanence, where bodies and things are seen in terms of their endless possibilities for the variations that are always underway. As Spinoza (1959) noted, "No one has yet determined what the body can do" (p. 87).

Therefore, the reality of affect as a relational in-betweenness unfolding in a sensational field calls for a new theory of mediation or media relations that helps us understand Ingrid's attachment with her digital technologies and popular media as an immanent process connected with the flow of life and materiality. This is not possible with traditional theories of mediation because these presuppose that there is already a message (representation) that precedes the encounter. Massumi (2019) has noted that rather than an immanent world in movement, the concept of mediation often assumes a series of preconstituted things and parties (message, sender, receiver) that are fixed and confined individualities. The receiver or interpreter relates to the message through cognitive practices, such as retrieving and decoding information. With the pertinent critical tools, this receiver can also form new and alternative messages (counterrepresentation).

The problem that Massumi (2019) has observed with this understanding of mediation is that it is excessively imbued by theories of ideology, which presuppose that there is a conformity with power prior to any experience. Naturalized social relations shape the individual beliefs and modes of self-expression before the individual is aware of it. Thus, individuality is first considered in terms of conformity and later in terms of critique. However, both actions—conformity and critique—presume that the *idea* comes first and hence shapes the *logos*. Under this perspective, experience can be thought of only for how it fits the general categories of the social. It cannot be thought of in terms of singularities, a concept that Deleuze (1995) proposed to describe differences when objects are considered identical but still express particularities in terms of how they meet and mix with the world, creating sometimes unexpected configurations that resist capture and challenge thought.

Bee (2019), Massumi (2019), Manning and Massumi (2019), and others have suggested the concept of *immediation* as a way to bring back immanence and singularity to thinking with media and media relations. Thus, immediation is not about decoding, interpreting, or deconstructing something given, but it is about the ongoing experience of intermingling, folding, and relating with media. It is an immanent process, not just the movement between two differentiated points (sender–receiver). Henceforth, in immediation, media does not take the form of a representation but of an agentive environment of relations that extends over space and time. It seems, then, that both affect and immediation refer to fields of relations, which means that any mediation is necessarily always affective (Cefai, 2018).

In a technologically saturated culture, it is hard to think in a situation of mediation where someone sits in front of a screen fixed in place. It seems more of the times to think that the body is acting in interconnection with multiple mobile technologies and media-saturated environments (Brunner, 2020). Echoing this, it is important to note that Ingrid never simply watched YouTube videos, but these videos

flowed in a world of other simultaneous sensuous activity: drawing, dancing, and/or Snapchatting. This supplemental activity also unfolded with digital technologies, most prominently the iPad and different apps. So, Ingrid's relation with ongoing YouTube videos could be thought in terms of an immediation. That is, it was an experience of being in a free-floating medial movement that propagated toward her body, the iPad, and the other devices, creating a nonstopping ecology of sensation (Figure 1).

Finally, an important strand of affect studies connects with philosophy of media and media art. It looks at how technologies, when used relationally, can allow for the exploration of new modes of expression not anticipated by the technical parameters of their fabrication and conventional use (Simondon, 2020). This opens digital technology to a wider relational potential (Brunner, 2020; Hansen, 2014; Manning, 2013), and activates more open-ended entanglements between digital technologies and the sensing body in movement (Manning, 2013). I discuss later how Ingrid experimented with the relational potential of her digital devices in coordination with embodied movements, speeds, and gestures. Manning (2013) has described this with the notion of *technicity*, referring to the prosthetic or *more-than* space-time being enacted between the potential for a body to move and the technical affordances given by digital technologies. Thus, this *more-than* carries the power to "foreground previously untapped dimensions of the moving body, creating a body that is sensually emergent, alive with image and sound" (p. 63).

I continue the discussion of affect's pedagogical potential through a learning event that I have called *the making of the Chucky Meme*. I do this with the aim to show how affect allows a thinking of learning from the middle and with attention to the agency of things and bodies. In anticipation of this further discussion, I have written some passages to clarify the methodological tenets of doing research at home in the layered roles of mother, scholar, and art educator.

Methodology

The methodology of this microstudy works at the intersection of ethnography and affect studies. Ethnography is a mode of knowledge and research practice generated by locating oneself outside one's cultural milieu for extended periods of time, familiarizing oneself with the cultural tools, languages, and modes of expression of a given community or society. However, in the past 20 years, feminist, postcolonialist, and Indigenous knowledges have problematized what stands as ethnographic fieldwork and knowledge (Clifford, 1988). By attending to issues of gender, race, and the growing precarity of academic work, the strict division between home and field has been repeatedly problematized. Versions of ethnographic work with fewer means, less time, and closer to home have emerged, revealing the imbricated nature of the personal and the professional, the public and the intimate aspects of culture. Some have described this shift with the concept of *patchwork ethnography* (Günel et al., 2020), noticing that contemporary ethnographic styles recombine the concepts of home and field. They do this while engaging in the rigorous processes of research, but also while recognizing that the study of contemporary cultures needs knowledges and narratives that contain gaps, resistances, and partialities connected to existential conditions of precarity, vulnerability, and minoritarian thinking that shape researchers' lives.

Feminism has been among the knowledges that have problematized more intensively the separation between field and home central to conventional ethnography (Visweswaran, 1994). Practices of being responsible for the care of children not only reduce the possibility of being away from home but are characterized by encounters that put the mother nearer

to unreducible experiences of otherness that, as happens in ethnography, prompt the mother/scholar/art educator to know differently and to problematize subjectivity. My recent scholarship (Trafí-Prats, 2019; Trafí-Prats & Caton, 2020) has developed a series of microstudies that connect with the tenets of patchwork ethnography and with feminist maternal experience, where I have thought about relations of childhood, learning, and pedagogy while inhabiting an ongoing space of encounters with the other. The work of contemporary artists Mierle Lades Ukeles, Lenka Clayton, and others (Trafí-Prats, 2019) as well as philosophers of motherhood like Lisa Baraitser (2009, 2017) have offered me different ways of seeing maternal experiences as important sites of knowledge and sensory attunement that are defined by fragmentary, anecdotic, disjunctive, and highly material onto-epistemological modes. Thinking about everyday encounters at home with my daughter has helped me to value mundane moments that "stick out" (Baraitser, 2009, p. 14) because of their newness, oddness, or the surprising effects that have propelled me to notice sensuous and embodied qualities of knowledge that before I had not perceived. I sustain that becoming attuned to minor aspects of children's activity among materials is important for art educators to understand how passages into new forms of sensibility occur in learning events (Hickey-Moody, 2013b).

Such an approach coincides with ethnographer Kathleen Stewart's (2012) defense of an orientation toward the social, centered on the emergent, sensuous, and highly aesthetic aspects of everyday life scenes. Stewart has affirmed that such orientation helps researchers to think life as less directed by macrosystems and instead feel it as it composes itself in assemblages of heterogenous things that are "disparate and incommensurate" (p. 518). By attending to such emerging qualities of the everyday, a new form of social science can be developed that is less about capture and moralization and more about fostering new modes of attunement that generate a sensibility for the heterogeneous and transmutational qualities of events. Fostering attunement to the emergent, surprising, and unplanned while relaxing established criteria can generate more nuanced and complex knowledge of how art learning matters; how it is immanent to the worlds where learning takes shape; and how learning is composed with organic, inorganic, digital, and virtual matters that can be neither anticipated nor reduced by a curriculum plan, a teacher, or a set of standards (Atkinson, 2018).

The Making of the Chucky Meme

As I was preparing lunch, Ingrid told me that she was working on her own Chucky Meme animation and showed me a series of drawings in her iPad featuring a teen girl in shoujo style that resembled her (Figure 2). I asked, "Chucky? Is this the Chucky in the horror movies?" She responded, "No, not the movies. I am talking about the meme with the song 'Wanna Play?'" She recognized that I had no idea what she was referring to and played an animation in YouTube. It showed a girl drawn in a *chibi*[3] style with a pale complexion, dressed in a romantic mini-gown and with robotic hands. In the animation, the girl's expressions changed rapidly in accordance with the soundtrack, which mixed sounds and utterances from the original Chucky films. The expressions went from innocent (smile, waving), to ambiguously friendly (wide open eyes and dramatic teethy smile), to sometimes horrid (hollow eyes with black tears). These were interspersed with a few transitional frames of an empty black background that sometimes was slashed across and other times splashed with blood.

I asked Ingrid what it was about the Chucky Meme video that she liked. "I like it because it is weird," she responded, and reiterated, "I like weird things." Fisher (2016) has characterized the weird as a mood in fiction and a mode of perception in which inner and outer relations



Figure 2. Screen with the YouTube animation that motivated Ingrid's Chucky Meme and series of stills from Ingrid's animation, reproduced with kind permission of the author.

rearticulate. More specifically, he describes the weird as a fascination for "which lies beyond standard perception, cognition and experience" (p. 8). The weird presents itself as something that is out of place from the domestic. There is wrongness in the weird in the sense that there are things mixed up and out of place. In the Chucky Meme, the chibi character that fascinated Ingrid embodies a number of mixed-up, unfitting features; a little cute girl utters gruesome sentences and enacts vile gestures. The weird operates and fascinates by delivering something disjointed in a familiar world while not resolving the puzzlement of how it has come to be disjointed (Fisher, 2016). That is why the weird is felt more like a sensibility, a mood, or an atmosphere than a concrete representation of something.

Such disjointed sensibility was confirmed later, when, following my own curiosity, I went to YouTube and found out that there were numerous Chucky Meme animations using the same soundtrack, "The Chucky Megaremix." While all of them had original graphics, many echoed an anime style, with shoujo and girl chibis as main characters. Shoujo characters are conventionally associated with cute, soft, heartwarming feelings. However, contemporary Japanese popular culture is filled with radical explorations of femininity including *gurokawaii* (grotesque cute) that, like the weird, carries a disjoined aesthetics and suggests unresolvable tensions connected to gender, power, and the passage from girlhood into adulthood (Tso et al., 2020). The graphics that I encountered in YouTube resonated with these aesthetics.

Returning to Fisher's (2016) argument that the weird is a mode of perception where the relation between inner and outer rearticulates, I suggest thinking in Ingrid's enchantment with the Chucky Meme and its gurokawaii aesthetics as an experimentation with another mode of perception that clearly offered the potential of something new (O'Sullivan, 2001). As Massumi (as cited in Manning & Massumi, 2019) has noted, the potential of this something new cannot be explained in language yet because it is purely affective. It functions as a feeling formed in a past event, the viewing of the Chucky Meme, and that is carried forward and reactivated in new events, taking new forms. With this in mind, I move to the next part of the story.

After working for several hours on her own Chucky drawings, Ingrid came to my office to ask for my help in generating an animation. Her plan was to play the "The Chucky Megaremix" soundtrack in the laptop while passing the stills in her iPad, while also trying to follow the pace of the lyrics and rhythm. She told me that my role was to video-record the iPad screen using my phone. Because the stills had been created with Sketches Pro, which is an app for static drawing, they needed to be moved manually by touching on each still to give a sense of animation. Ingrid clicked play in the YouTube video and began to move the stills rhythmically. I held the phone camera over the iPad and recorded. Expressions and sounds in "The Chucky Megaremix" defined the ways Ingrid relayed the stills, making sure that certain images matched certain lyrics.

The event of making the animation revealed a case of immanent, embodied, and environmental medial movement and the imbricated relation of affect and mediation. Medial movement traversed our bodies, technologies, images, and space, constituting a milieu of expressivity, where particles from one element of the assemblage passed into other elements to create a form, the Chucky Meme animation.

A few days after our collaboration, I found in my iPad a number of video files of what appeared to be trials of the Chucky Meme animation. These revealed that Ingrid had gone through an experimentation with specific body and camera movements, gestures, and speeds to develop capacities and techniques to animate the stills. There was a case where Ingrid moved the camera slightly back and forth as if she was vibrating with the song's rhythmics. In another trial, she quickly

zoomed in on the image by progressively moving the camera forward toward a detail. And in another one, when the beat got repetitive and the sentence "Do you wanna play?" prolonged, Ingrid swished the camera rapidly from right to left, blurring the image.

As discussed earlier, Manning (2013) has proposed the concept of technicity to speak of a generative relationality of mutual recomposition between digital technologies and the body, in which the body is not just a preconstituted body that uses the technology, but also, it is formed in mutual feedback with the technology. For Ingrid to perceive how her body movements with the camera combined with the soundtrack and the drawings to form an animation, she needed a provisional visualization (video) to see, feel, and think about the effects of such movements. By seeing these provisional videos, Ingrid was able to recalibrate speeds, directions, proximities, and other movements with the camera. It was by working in this iterative loop between movement–perception and body–camera–video that the milieu of Ingrid's body and the milieu of the technology began to function transversally, forming a combined milieu with which to create an animation that expressed a level of weirdness (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). This reveals that the making of the Chucky Meme was not just the creation of a video animation. It was also the formation of a remarkable aesthetic experiment in inventing perception, sense-making, and a body that augments its capacities in such pursuit by being in affective co-composition with things.[4]

Pedagogical Implications

The making of the Chucky Meme shows that affective pedagogy requires thinking and acting in relational fields that are not linear. Considering relational fields can make educators wonder about how things come into visibility in processes of art learning and disrupt the notion that something that comes to expression needs to be attributed to an individual (intentions, will, inspiration). The concept of relational field suggests that individuals act embedded in already ongoing environmental movement with potential to affect. In turn, this brings nonlinearity, which unsettles the notion that something that comes to expression has been determined by existing cultural constructs or influences. Instead, it suggests that, in affective pedagogies, it is impossible to think in terms of origins because everything is happening from the middle.

As Massumi (as cited in Manning & Massumi, 2019) has noted, all expression comes from backgrounds of past activity that are grounded in the body. The potential of an event that has been carried into expression, like the Chucky Meme animation, continues its virtual existence in the body. It is "ready for reactivation in future events, either as conditions of new emergence or as captured potential feeding a self-perpetuating structure" (p. 280). We can certainly think of the making of the Chucky Meme as a process of carving expression and grounding potential in Ingrid's body. The workings of that carving are perceivable in the many small animations that she created to find ways of making her body work in mutual feedback with the affordances of the camera to create a sense of the weird that carried through her video meme. Also, the many recombined details in her meme, taken from some of her previous shoujo drawings (Figure 1) and from graphics in the other Chucky memes on YouTube (Figure 2), evoke this notion of modes of expression that appear and reappear, existing in relations of combination, variation, and contagion. This is not because they are connected to intentional representations, but because they are potentials grounded in the body and reactivated in new occasions.

I end by suggesting two dispositions that may support educators in thinking about art learning from the middle of relational fields. The first disposition is attuning to the the immanence of the learning event by relaxing preformed commitments with plans, objectives, or standards. To feel learning's immanence, it is important to move with the event's openness

for generating something new that we do not know yet. There was a moment in the making of the Chucky Meme when I significantly felt the event's immanence and became affected by its aesthetics, sensuousness, and vitality. This was during the collaboration in video-recording the animation, when Ingrid asked me to use my phone as she moved the stills on her iPad. In the act of recording, I noticed that Ingrid's iPad screen's surface was populated with stains and marks, probably resulting from the long hours drawing the stills. This made me think that the video we were generating would not only be the projection of a visual animation, but also, it would be a display of a more complex materiality. Then I began to notice too that the recording was absorbing other corporeal effects, including Ingrid's pulse and embodied rhythms as she passed the stills, and my own reflected silhouette holding the phone over the iPad's surface. Ingrid's screen acted as a membrane, or what Bruno (2017) has described as a *surface tension*, capturing the image both as a visual and as a haptic materiality. This made me realize how I was not an observer anymore, but an insider to the event's immanence, where I could feel and live its "affective tones" (Atkinson, 2018, p. 122) and be moved by its vitality.

The second disposition that I propose is to recognize the embeddedness of form and expression in local space-temporal assemblages, where things come together in certain ways and are pushed by unperceivable forces. As mentioned earlier, Ingrid had very little experience using a laptop. Not only did the laptop rapidly become a body extension, but also, it often connected to other things like a pair of Bluetooth headphones, an iPad, and an ongoing medial movement from YouTube. It is easy to fall into the moralizing path of assessing the long hours of exposure to popular media and digital devices as developmentally detrimental for children. However, attending to the situatedness of assemblages and their modes of gathering force provides an alternative way of thinking about the value of these and other activities, which leads us to assess whether these assemblages sensorially recalibrated Ingrid's body and extended her capacities to move, feel, perceive, and think (Atkinson, 2018). In this respect, Manning's (2013) theory of technicity is key to not seeing bodies as merely passive receptacles of technologies and understanding them as working in mutual feedback with digital technology to potentialize the body's sensuousness.

Such an approach to valuation offers ways not only to assess capacious events like the one discussed in the article, but also to consider differently events where children resist or do not engage with certain activities, provocations, or materials that educators have thought to be good for their learning. Valuing according to affect can help educators analyze these events in less individualized ways and stop attributing the lack of acting or its anomalies to children's deficit of interest, skills, or knowledge, and to consider instead the more-than-human and more-than-individual, material-semiotic affects that oftentimes depress children's bodies and their capacities to act.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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ENDNOTES

[1] *Shoujo* is a Japanese term used in manga and anime to describe female genres and characters.

[2] Gacha Life and Gacha Club are apps developed by Lunime for the creation of characters and skits. Some players further develop these skits using video-editing software and upload them onto YouTube channels.

[3] *Chibi* is a style of manga and anime that represents characters in toddler-shaped bodies with large heads.

[4] I write this note at the end of this section, so there is sufficient background for the comment inserted here to make sense. In the process of peer reviews, I have received critical comments about leaving unaddressed important issues concerning ethics. These included not having sufficiently reflected on Ingrid's intentionality, as well as issues related to power and surveillance. Although the focus of this article is not on ethics, I want to take the opportunity to clarify that such questions hold paradigmatic assumptions that are at odds with the article's philosophical approach. Assuming that research with children should begin from children's intentionality and hard political issues like power structures and surveillance is a possible paradigmatic approach to research ethics, but it is not the approach that applies to this article. As Bennet (2010) has posed, scholarship framing ethics and politics in such terms has often looked with contempt at the possibility that ethics could be thought of as a practice of feminist micropolitics where care concerns relational and environmental acts. Affect is propelled by unexpected, odd, disjoined relations. An ethics that is affective considers how in such relations experience matters in ways that everyone in the relation becomes with and is rendered capable (Haraway, 2016). A perspective of affect follows an ethics of desire, creation, and collectivity, rather than an ethics of individuality, critique, and negativity. This means that I do not approach the practice of ongoing processes of consent as being only a moral mandate. I see ethics too as a creative process in which children and I immerse and participate in relational processes that besides being moral are also affective, aesthetic, and environmental. In this case, ethical practice resides on moving and being moved by trajectories and relays that enable collective invention, which is what is at stake in the making of the Chucky Meme.